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§1| Introduction: Vattimo and Postmodernity1 
One of the best travelled and most commented upon philosophies to emerge from Italy since 
Gramsci has been the peculiar marriage between hermeneutics and nihilism offered by Gianni 
Vattimo known as il pensiero debole or "weak thought."  Weak thought is essentially linked to 
the postmodern condition, which Vattimo holds originates from the writings of first Nietzsche 
and then Heidegger and in the significance of their respective notions of nihilism and 
hermeneutics.2  The originality of weak thought resides in the move, grounded in an ethics of 
interpretation, to a new, weaker, formulation of truth rather than the rejection of truth and the 
death of subjectivity and postmodernity is to be celebrated since it is that epoch in which this 
liberating ethics is made actual.  This paper will describe the background to Vattimo's general 
philosophy and its inherent tendency to irrationalism before discussing his own ethics of 
interpretation as a response to this problem and describing the postmodern subjectivity which 
necessarily arises out of his position. 
§2| Weak Thought: The Marriage of Hermeneutics and Nihilism 
The foundation of Vattimo’s position is to be found primarily in those thinkers who have defined 
his approach to philosophy, principally Heidegger and Nietzsche.3  From the former arises the 
adherence to hermeneutics and an interpretative understanding of the world; from the latter, an 
acceptance of the consequences of nihilism.4  Hermeneutics is most readily understood as the 
turning away from a universal, Kantian position to one of localised and, therefore, relative 
reason; as Vattimo himself puts it, "… the subject is not the bearer of the Kantian a priori, but 
the heir to a finite-historical language that makes possible and conditions the access of the 
subject to itself and to the world." [OI; p. 12/8]  It is still the case that the world is experienced 
through categories of the understanding and that true reality is inaccessible to the human mind 
since it would not – and could not without concepts – "make sense" to him.  However, following 
Heidegger, Vattimo holds that these concepts are not universal, but that one’s perception of the 
world is determined by the situation into which one is thrown.  The categories and concepts 
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through which understanding ourselves, others and our situation is possible are inherited through 
our community, tradition or language, that is our historical and geographical location into which 
we were "accidentally thrown."5 
As such, the subject – to truly know himself – has to interrogate himself, to interpret 
rather than merely process his world: the hermeneutic circle of Heidegger's Dasein.6  The 
conditions through which the subject understands reality are hidden from him; be they in his 
unconscious or the structures of meaning he uses to express his understanding.  Only through the 
act of expressing his world can he disclose those categories which shape his perception of the 
world.  Instead of rational interrogation of the world, one must interrogate the world 
hermeneutically: 
There are no transcendental conditions of possibility for experience which might be 
attainable through some type of reduction or epoché suspending our ties to historical-
cultural, linguistic, categorical horizons.  The conditions of possibility for experience 
are always qualified…  The foundation, the beginning, the initial transmission of our 
discourse cannot, in other words, but be a hermeneutic foundation. [PD; p.13/152] 
Understanding is a fundamental way in which the subject relates himself to the world: the 
conditions which make experience possible are cultural givens which are revealed through the 
subject’s interpretation of the representation of the world which confronts him.  Hermeneutics 
holds that a subject becomes aware of his categories of understanding through the process of 
interpreting what the world is for him. 
It is in this turning away from, on the one hand, a vision of truth as a fixed, stable 
structure and, on the other hand, from the universal categories of Kantian idealism, that 
hermeneutics appears to inevitably incline to relativism.  If the conditions of possibility for 
experience are culturally and not transcendentally given, then it is obvious that they cannot claim 
absolute validity: they are a tradition or form of life which the subject just happens to inhabit.  
Moreover, the justification of the metaphysical truth which the tradition holds is not to be found 
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in an eternal, fixed “real” world behind the “apparent” world, but, in the subjective values of an 
individual or social group and their interests.7  Hermeneutics tends, it seems, to either relativism 
(truth-for-us) or nihilism (no truth, only interpretations) and postmodern thought is most notably 
distinguished from modern thought in responding to this decline in metaphysics.  In fact, 
according to Vattimo, the inherent inclination of hermeneutics to nihilism determines much of 
the debate in contemporary European philosophy, forming the basis for characteristic responses 
from diverse thinkers.  Whether they openly embrace the nihilistic consequences (Deleuze), see 
the relativism as a game (Rorty), or, attempt to overcome nihilism through either conservatism 
(Gadamer) or procedural formalism (Habermas), they are all aware of the inclination of 
hermeneutics as opposed to the stability metaphysics.8 
Vattimo does not concede the philosophical commitment to truth as do the former two 
positions, nor does he shy from the nihilistic consequences of hermeneutics as do the latter two 
positions; instead he returns to the perceived origins of hermeneutics and attempts to unite the 
Nietzschean and Heideggerean insights into another response: weak thought.  As he sees it, the 
true tendency of hermeneutics is to (weak) nihilism; if it refuses its fate it falls into one of two 
errors: strong nihilism or metaphysics.  The former, perhaps, finds its best expression in 
existentialism and its relation to the absurd.  If the world faces ultimate melt down, if the 
universe is infinite, if god is dead, if there are no longer any absolute truths et cetera, can my 
choices really matter?  Does anything really matter?9  One chooses and rechooses with no 
opportunity for continuity; if I choose the world then, it is my choosing alone which matters and 
the new, the novel is given value.  Anything old and fixed must be chosen again, the subject 
must feel his power through the devaluation of values and the arbitrary creation of new values.  
Ultimately this strong nihilism is either irrational and destructive or it seeks once more a stable 
structure, falling back into metaphysics: man seeks to construct another god or authority that can 
fix and stabilise the world.   
Vattimo's mistrust of metaphysics is Heideggerean in nature: truth is not fixed in the way 
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believed by the philosophical tradition, rather Being gives itself historically.  Man can describe a 
perspective of Being but cannot catch it in its totality.  However, metaphysics and its worldview 
(the technological-scientific world of Western capitalism) privilege one perspective over the 
others, stating it as the whole and complete truth.10  It is in this way that science can claim to be 
truer than the moral and human discourses, even though their respective truth values are in a 
certain sense incommensurable.  They are different perspectives on, sometimes but rarely, the 
same object.11
 
 In other words, the Heideggerean critique holds that metaphysics is a form of 
violence against thought: it illegitimately restricts and limits thinking.  One must think in a 
certain way, one must see a certain perspective as absolute, or one is silenced and irrational.  
Yet, any description is made possible only through an ungrounded appropriation of conditions of 
the possibility for experience.  As such, any description implicitly contains these conditions not 
only as the possibility for experience, but also as the limit or horizon of experience.  The 
experience must, in a sense, be contracted to fit their limits.  The hermeneutic interpretation of 
truth reveals the limitation and necessarily constrained claims of any description.  Truth is rather 
an opening where one can glimpse the totality that is hidden behind the part.  It is easy to see 
how nihilism can easily fall back into metaphysics.  Absolute perspectives often arise out of 
critical attacks, replacing the "false" version of the truth with the "true" one; this is loosely 
termed the violence of metaphysics. 
 Vattimo refuses both metaphysics and nihilism in their most stringent form.  Instead he 
offers a "weak" or positive nihilism which is a direct consequence of the hermeneutical position: 
The critique that hermeneutics can and must move against the techno-scientific 
world is aimed, if anything, to aid it in a recognition of its own nihilistic meaning 
and to take it up as a guiding thread for judgements, choices and the orientation of 
individual and collective life. [OI; p.35/26] 
Much of contemporary philosophy attempts to regain the true in its strongest form, that of the 
Platonic essence: fixed and permanent.  However, Vattimo proposes his weak nihilism as our 
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only chance of not falling back into metaphysical violence: "The fulfilled [compiuto] nihilist has 
understood that nihilism is his or her sole opportunity." [FM; p. 27/19]12  Weak nihilism allows 
that which is different a voice and a value, allowing these voices to communicate with other, 
even dominant, strains of thought rather than excluding difference into the realms of nonsense, 
non-meaning and un-reason.  Of the four positions offered above, relativism (Rorty) and 
subjectivism (Deleuze) celebrate difference but do so at the cost of communication and truth.  At 
the other extreme, conservatism (Gadamer) and procedural formalism (Habermas) both keep the 
commitment to communication and truth, but silence difference.  Weak thought oscillates 
between these two extremes. 
 Vattimo's position depends upon the distinction between the strong nihilism outlined 
above and a weak nihilism.  The former is extreme nihilism, the destructive theory which rejects 
all authority and values.  The latter, however, is extreme protestantism: it not only questions the 
church, it places god himself in question.  It allows one to interrogate one’s being, which is not 
fixed and permanent, and the being of one’s ethical substance or community; that is, those 
categories from which meaning arises.  Weak nihilism is the transcendence of freedom, the 
ability to negate what is absolute, yet simultaneously recognise a new, "weaker" truth in the 
structures of meaning and orders of values found in the world, for without the concepts and 
categories of a tradition, the subject would not perceive the world at all.  The tradition supplies 
the foundations with which one can appropriate and perceive truth, yet one is simultaneously 
aware that they are bounded and but one representation of truth limited by their very own 
possibility of understanding.13 
 Vattimo interprets both Nietzsche and Heidegger as exponents, or originators, of that 
which he calls weak thought.  He sees them as accepting the principle of nihilism: there are only 
interpretations and interpretations of interpretations, but, according to him, this does not commit 
them to strong nihilism.  It is the oscillation between the destiny of Being (Heidegger) and the 
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re-evaluation of values (Nietzsche) which secures the position of weak thought as opposed to 
relativism and subjectivism, on the one hand, and conservatism and formalism, on the other.   
Weak thought reveals that the categories of understanding through which one apprehends 
the world distort and corrupt it; but, it is the awareness of the fact that mine is a perspective 
amongst perspectives that initiates a movement towards a consideration of pluralism (not 
relativism) via the hermeneutic realisation of one’s prejudice in apprehending the world.  
Vattimo in the preface to Il Pensiero Debole marks out exactly the origin, direction and aims of 
weak thought.14
 
 (a) Serious consideration of the Marxist-Nietzschean view that there is a 
connection between knowledge and domination inside and outwith the subject.  This first 
criterion is simply the acknowledgement of the nihilist discovery: one’s conditions of 
understanding the world are not true absolutely, but originate from one’s historical and 
geographical situation.  Furthermore, the belief that such conditions are absolutely true is a myth 
propagated in the interests of whom or what such conditions serve.  Conditions of understanding 
move from being perspectives to prejudices or, even more strongly put, ideologies.  The subject 
of weak thought is aware of conditions of understanding as perspectives and as such liberates 
himself from the power of absolute claims.  As such, Vattimo draws a direct link between his 
own fulfilled nihilist and Nietzsche’s Übermensch: nihilism does not lead to despair and non-
meaning, but to the affirmation of values as my values and your values as your own.15 
 (b) Not using this discovery as a path to emancipation via the de-masking or 
demystification of power-knowledge constructs (ideologies), but casting a "friendlier" eye on the 
discursive procedures and symbolic forms of one’s world or form of life; accepting them as one 
possible experience of being.16  Instead of the aggressive critique, however, weak thought holds 
that such perspectives hold a partial trace of the true or Being.  One does not deconstruct for the 
sake of deconstructing, or to free the world from corrupt perspectives, one hermeneutically 
interprets categories of understanding to separate the real truths from those contingent ones.  
Such a separation of real and contingent truths depends on the final criterion.  In other words, 
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Vattimo seeks to temper the possible excess of the Nietzschean position which, without 
constraints, would tend to subjectivism. 
 Finally, (c) the identification of language as the home of being which holds "traces" or 
"memories" of truth.  Such interpretation, coupled with the linguistic representation of truths, 
can lead to the realisation of that which is true in an important sense, and that which is 
contingent or purely symbolic.  A provisional stab at the distinction must be something along the 
lines of a justified prejudice which helps one to experience (part of) the true as opposed to an 
unjustified prejudice which restricts and corrupts one’s experience of truth, doing so in the 
interests of an outmoded institutional or economic power.  Weak thought, unlike most other 
forms of postmodernity, still aims to be rational and conditioned by the true.  It is this adherence 
to rationality, as a prejudice which encourages thinking but does not restrict it, which commits 
weak thought to truth and not the rejection of this for epistemological anarchism. 
 These three criteria seem to encapsulate, in a nutshell, the difference of Vattimo’s 
postmodern position from that of his contemporaries.  He returns to Nietzsche and Heidegger in 
order to develop an alternative to conservatism, relativism, subjectivism and formalism.  Vattimo 
is at pains to stress the common thread between Nietzsche and Heidegger, that which he terms 
the secularisation of philosophy; that is, the dissolution of absolute foundations.  Yet, weak 
thought is original because of the inherent difference between the two thinkers: the unresolvable 
tension between the liberalism and subjectivism of Nietzsche and the conservatism of 
Heidegger.17  It is this tension which secures the oscillation between conservatism and 
subjectivism central to Vattimo’s ethics. 
  Although Vattimo is intent on his commitment to truth, it is an enfeebled truth.  It is a 
truth which gives itself historically in terms of those conditions of understanding which the 
subject possesses.  It is following on from this that the distinction between strong and weak truth 
can clearly be delineated: "Hence a scientific truth is ahistorical and universal, while 
philosophical truth has no other meaning than to be the truth of the existence of the one who 
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professes it and propounds it to the world." [AD; p. 47/40]  Strong thought is comfortable, 
conformist thought based on the scientific model: where my categories of understanding are in 
total agreement with the world in which I live.  The object as perceived consolidates and 
reinforces the categories of perceiving.  One’s metaphysics adequately describe the object in an 
acceptable manner.  The subject’s perception of the world and his response to it is wholly 
internal to his form of life.  The subject does nothing but reproduce those categories of his 
tradition: the rules of knowledge and conceptual perception which constitute his being oblige 
him to unconditionally see truth in a certain way.  The categories are normative in the sense that, 
if the subject wishes to experience truth at all, they oblige him to experience the world in a 
certain way.18   
Weak truth, alternatively, is bound to he who enunciates, and in enunciating learns of 
himself.  It concerns the truth of the method or the metaphysics in which one’s claims to strong 
truth is grounded.  An internal point of view is suspended and the subject transcends the given 
through hermeneutic interrogation, asking himself: what are the categories, and what is their 
origin, which determine that I experience the world in this manner?  This is not to take an 
extremely external point of view which records the claims made on a subject by a particular 
tradition, for such a position requires a transcendental and articulate subject.19  Subjectivity, for 
Vattimo, is constituted by tradition and not external to it.  Rather, hermeneutical interrogation 
demands a moderately external perspective: the categories of this way of life are a reason to hold 
a certain belief or experience truth in a certain way.  Nietzsche’s maxim, to continue dreaming 
aware that one is dreaming, is often invoked by Vattimo, and it seems to capture the essence of 
understanding required by the moderately external point of view.20  Hermeneutic, interpretative 
subjectivity consists in understanding the claim of a certain tradition on knowledge without 
necessarily endorsing it.  It is a shadow of subjectivity, an ethical knowledge of obligation but 
empty of any particular epistemological obligations. 
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Hermeneutical subjectivity takes this moderately external form; in reflecting on his form 
of life, the subject, in a sense, puts himself outside of it.  He asks himself, given this form of life, 
what is he obliged to experience.  Yet, because he is not taking the internal point of view, the 
obligation is not immediately binding.  Similarly, he can ask himself the reciprocal question, 
given this obligation, what does this reveal about the conditions which make this perception of 
reality possible.  In reflecting on his experience of truth, the subject is able to disclose the 
conditions that generate his response (that is, to reveal his way of life).  It is to suspend the 
immediately binding nature of one’s social existence or tradition.  Furthermore, given the 
realisation that the conditions which make knowledge possible also simultaneously constrain and 
limit truth, the subject becomes aware that what he holds to be true is a perspective of reality 
governed by his categories, rather than reality itself.  Truth is, therefore, the best approximation 
of reality given the particular subject’s cultural and linguistic baggage which makes reality’s 
disclosure possible whilst simultaneously constraining it. 
Yet, such a hermeneutical ontology: an interpretative knowledge of things rather than a 
prepositional order of knowledge itself, can so easily fall into either irrationalism, anti-
intellectualism, relativism or even conservatism (that is, the tradition itself is true and cannot be 
acted against).  This fear is based upon the simple lack of that moment of certainty (Descartes’ 
clear and distinct perception; Plato’s irrefutable proposition, et cetera) which has dominated 
Western thought.  Such conformity to principles or methods can only be the truth in accordance 
with a perspective.  Perspectives themselves cannot accord with principles which verify their 
truth; they are foundationless and groundless.  Any method of knowledge which has such a 
moment of certainty has already appropriated a certain perspective as the one sole True 
perspective: Being is corrupted, distorted and becomes sufficient reason for any statements 
which adhere to its perspective. 
 Weak truth is, instead, the truth of the perspectives on the world and as such 
hermeneutical: 
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Firstly, truth does not amount to a "true proposition" but rather to a general order of 
the world, a "historical structure", a form of life, or an epoch of Being.  Secondly, the 
inauguration of this new epoch does not depend on the individual and his or her 
decision, for only in such a new world could a person capable of such a decision be 
born.  At most, the arrival of the new era and the birth of the decisive individual can 
only surface together. [AD; p. 64/55] 
 Weak truth is the interrogative existence of those categories of understanding or the objective 
representation of one’s community, within which one finds oneself situated.  It is the existence 
of the conditions of knowledge which are themselves ultimately groundless (nihilism) yet allow 
one to comprehend, appropriate and act meaningfully in the world.  To know who one is, is to 
know the truth of one’s time and immediate existence.  For this reason, Vattimo uses the 
metaphor of "living" or "dwelling" as the notion of weak truth: 
As a metaphor for speaking of hermeneutical truth, dwelling might best be 
understood as though one were dwelling in a library; whereas the idea of truth as 
correspondence conceives of knowledge of the true as the certain [certo] possession 
of an "object" by way of an adequate representation, the truth of dwelling is by 
contrast the competence of the librarian who does not possess entirely, in a single act 
of transparent comprehension, all of the contents of all of the books amongst which 
he lives, nor even the first principles upon which the contents depend.  One cannot 
compare such knowledge-possession through the command of first principles to the 
competence of librarianship, which knows where to look because it knows how the 
volumes are classified and is also acquainted with the "subject catalogue." [OI; p. 
104/82-83]21 
This metaphor is perhaps the most revealing aspect of Vattimo’s writings on weak thought since 
it opens up a way to understand the subject of weak thought.  His originality and significance lie 
not only in his commitment to truth – albeit an enfeebled truth – but also in his refusal to 
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embrace wholeheartedly the death of the subject.  Subjectivity is, for him, always constituted by 
a tradition and not transcendent to history, yet hermeneutical interrogation requires that shadow 
of subjectivity alluded to above; that ethical echo.  The object of weak thought is clearly 
understood as Being which gives itself historically depending on the conditions of knowledge 
which determine it and are reciprocally determined by it. The subject, however, finds itself 
dwelling within knowledge of the true, but not a truth which is obvious, clear and distinct.  
Rather the truth is to be disclosed through the interpretative action of the subject.  The library is 
the ethical or epistemological substance, in which all values or entities are explained and 
justified, and from which all norms or rules governing knowledge arise.  The subject faced with 
a question must research and interpret this substance to reveal its truth: that is, suspend the 
immediately binding nature of immanent subjectivity. 
 Being is a destiny revealed through the truth of a tradition.  To belong, to dwell, in an 
ethical substance is to participate in a history.  To avoid falling back into metaphysics, or to 
resist the domination of strong absolutist claims, Vattimo proposes an acceptance of a destiny:  
If it wishes to escape this relapse into metaphysics, hermeneutics must make explicit 
its own ontological background, that is, the Heideggerean idea of a destiny of Being 
that is articulated as the concatenation of openings, of the systems of metaphors that 
make possible and qualify our experience of the world. [OI; p. 134/108] 
In accepting the weaker truth of forms of life, one recognises that they hold partial truths and 
that, in every epoch, they express some aspect of the truth.  Hermeneutic interpretation 
distinguishes those conditions which reveal truth and those which determine truth in the service 
of a hidden agenda.  The former are to be retained, the latter to be overcome.  In a sense, it is to 
recognise reason and truth becoming actual through the ontological expression of Being in each 
age, and Vattimo adds: 
… the rationality we have reached consists in the fact that, essentially involved in a 
process (into which we are always-already "thrown") we always-already know, at 
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least to a certain extent, where we are going and how we must go there.  But to orient 
ourselves, we need to reconstruct and interpret the process in as complete and 
persuasive a manner as possible.  It would be an error to believe we can jump outside 
the process, somehow grasping the arché, the principle, the essence or the ultimate 
structure. [OI; p. 135/109] 
Even if one accepts the idea of a destiny of Being, even if one recognises that the 
reinterpretation of one’s "tradition" holds a way to truth, his metaphor of the librarian reveals the 
need for an ethical subjectivity which hovers between pure immanence and transcendentalism.  
The denial of full transparency, the idea that the subject does not "know" his identity nor the 
truth of his situation in an act of clear and distinct perception or rational inquiry, is to interrogate 
oneself and the objective determinations of one’s identity.  Weak thought suspends the 
immediacy of one’s tradition and interrogates it, yet how does one know what is justifiable 
prejudice (that which helps one understand the world) and unjustifiable prejudice (that which 
limits one’s understanding of the world)?  Vattimo allows the hermeneutic subject the resources 
of the librarian: the catalogue, index listings, et cetera, and these – when made explicit – should 
show that one metaphysics can be proven more apt or better than another in apprehending a 
certain truth of a particular situation.  In other words, Vattimo does not espouse reason or 
rational argumentation, he encourages debate when two perspectives collide on a 
commensurable topic and he consistently reiterates throughout his work the positive role 
philosophy should occupy in constructing a vision of human existence.22  To research one’s 
ethical substance, one’s tradition and, therefore, ultimately one’s identity so that one can find the 
"truth" of one’s being, requires the skill of the subject; the ability to interpret.  Such 
interpretation requires an ethics: living or dwelling within one’s ethical substance can only be 
possible through the possession of certain underlying values, talents or abilities.  If one dwells 
within a library and cannot read, one is restricted in the quest for the true.  It is for this reason 
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that Vattimo must articulate an ethics of interpretation, for if he fails to do so, then his position 
is susceptible to the twin horns of irrationalism: subjectivism and relativism..23 
Hermeneutics in general, and weak thought in particular, incline towards irrationalism.  If 
one’s categories of understanding, that is one’s perspective which make possible experience of 
the world, are not universal and arise from a structure into which one is thrown, then the way in 
which one perceives the world is either true for me (subjectivism) or true for us (relativism).  If 
there is a common philosophy of postmodernity, then it resides in responses to this problem 
generated by hermeneutic understanding; whether it be the embrace of irrationalism, or attempts 
to overcome it. 
It is obvious from the second criterion of weak thought – that is, that nihilism should not 
lead to the aggressive critique of structures of meaning, but to the realisation that if truth is 
possible, it is only weakly possible – that Vattimo remains committed to truth.  For this reason, 
he rejects the development of Nietzschean thought into the rampant liberalism of Deleuze who 
believes the creation of values itself is a value.24  Subjectivism describes the attitude of the strong 
nihilist who appropriates the truth of the tradition, but transcends it and ironically states: I 
recognise this truth, but I am above it; I can act as I wish.  If truth is not binding and the subject 
is aware of it being but a perspective, how can it obligate him to act or think in a certain way?  
The constraints which determine that he think in one way rather than another just fall away.  
One’s culturally given identity makes experience possible and informs one’s practical reasoning, 
but, without absolute validity, its motivational power is indecisive.  If Vattimo accepts strong 
nihilism and the subjectivism of the Nietzschean position, then the possibility of communication 
is lost, as is the possibility of interpretation.  The statement that there are only interpretations and 
that is the end of the matter, silences the philosopher. 
It would appear that hermeneutics, in order to hold on to the binding nature of truth and a 
partial objectivity, tends to relativism defined as the hypothesis that the values held by an agent 
arise from the way of life he just happens to inhabit.  Its truth is to grant one’s way of life 
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authority, yet this is in a sense to repeat the problem with subjectivism: the death of 
communication.  Interpretation is understood as an open dialogue with one’s tradition, yet where 
subjectivism rose above and negated the tradition, relativism immerses itself in the tradition: the 
agent is unable to criticise, rise above or interrogate it.  In either case, subjectivism or relativism, 
the commitment to truth, the ability to offer a better interpretation, is lost because either there are 
no reasons but my own, or there are reasons only for us and we cannot promote them to others. 
Where weak thought can concur with irrationalism is that "full objectivity" is 
unattainable.  Yet, conversely, traditions hold partial truths and this is motivating not due to false 
belief, but partial knowledge.  Therefore, history and tradition become the domain of truth and 
reason, yet the postulation of history as the domain of truth relies on an ethics of interpretation 
which can tease out the meaning for the interpreting subject.  There exists, though, truth in the 
tradition: this is not just any perspective, it is the perspective which is most loyal to the "guiding 
thread."  The guiding thread is nihilism, that is the openness to discussion and debate: the 
postulation of an interpretation which in its very positing denies any absolute claim on subjects.  
Thus, our (the postmodern subjects') tradition is nihilism and this involves a commitment to 
pluralism because we are perpetually aware that we cannot claim absolute validity for our 
tradition, whilst being aware that no other tradition is absolutely valid: "Not simply 'anything 
goes', but he who holds that everything goes and who also holds that there is even, above all,  
this additional 'thing' – which is the thesis that anything goes – he is more right than others." [my 
trans.] [VRF; p. 63]  History, as object, must remain open to interpretation and this is the basis of 
those metaphysical systems or methods which can claim to be weakly true: they are prejudices 
which aid one in apprehending, understanding and experiencing the world.  If Vattimo is 
committed to truth and to open communication, and he believes that not all perspectives are 
equally valid, then he has to reject irrationalism.  Weak thought, then, relies upon a normative 
ground which determines the process of interpretation.  Vattimo's significance resides in this 
ethics of interpretation. 
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§3| The Ethics of Interpretation 
Vattimo never gives a formal outline of his project but it is obvious that he is aware that if he is 
committed to hermeneutical truth, he requires an ethics to avoid the irrationalism of both 
subjectivism and relativism.  It seems that to overcome relativism a decision has to be made 
concerning the value of a specific perspective: does it disclose truth or does it corrupt and distort 
it?  How is it that an agent can decide to reject, have faith in or exchange interpretations?25  The 
simple answer is that underlying the agent’s interpretation of the world has to be an ethics which 
constrains and makes possible the appropriation of interpretations as both valid and reasonable.  
It is for this reason that hermeneutics, to avoid irrationalism, has to advocate an ethics.  
Vattimo’s ethics of interpretation arises out of his continual return to and rejection of three 
possible responses to the above problem which originate from Rorty, Gadamer and Habermas.26 
It was hinted earlier that Vattimo’s originality arises from the uneasy tension held 
between Heidegger and Nietzsche.  The positions he interrogates as instances of a post-
metaphysical ethics reflect this in that they are in many respects the extreme development of the 
two thinkers in separation.  For example, Rorty and his ethics of re-description seems to accept 
the implicit liberalism which originates in Nietzsche’s nihilism.  Similarly, Gadamer develops 
the conservative strain of Heidegger (and Habermas responds to this position, but does so by 
invoking formalism).  Vattimo tempers the subjectivism of Rorty with the historicism of 
Heidegger and the conservatism of Gadamer with the nihilism of Nietzsche.   
Rorty, according to Vattimo, responds to the threat of relativism by embracing creative 
subjectivism.27  The ethics of re-description holds that through adding a perspective, through 
changing one’s point of view, a problem can be overcome.  Vattimo criticises this on the basis 
that it privileges the artistic moment of creation and destruction of existing values.  It 
undermines continuity in favour of the new, yet it is the newness itself which becomes a value.  
It becomes the subjectivism which Vattimo was keen to temper with his commitment to 
historical truth: destroying and resisting all values for the sake of resistance itself; it is the death 
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of communication.  If this is his position, then Rorty is unable to overcome relativism because 
truth exists as either for-me or for-us and there are no grounds on which to resist, or even judge, 
false and corrupting interpretations.  Vattimo is closer to Gadamer than Rorty, because he shares 
with him the belief that truth is given historically and partially, and not – as Rorty holds – that 
there is no truth.28 
Gadamer, too, like Vattimo, felt the acute need to avoid subjectivism and relativism.  
Gadamer avoids subjectivism by holding that the agent interprets within an historical tradition 
which has developed independently of him.  However, although this overcomes subjectivism 
(that is, values are not for-me but for-the-tradition), it requires a further stipulation to overcome 
relativism: the interpreter's historical consciousness is not, according to Gadamer, contingent or 
arbitrary, but is rooted in the way an object has been previously understood.  Long before we are 
an individual, we are part of a common, shared tradition.  The arbitrariness of individual 
prejudices can be overcome by returning to this common logos which is determined by an 
anticipation of completeness which reviews interpretations in terms of things in themselves or 
with the aim of articulating a better understanding of the matter in hand. 
Thus, Gadamer is committed to truth as a regulative ideal which guides interpretation: the 
text has to be accepted as an authority which will disclose its own truth to the interpreter who 
grants it this normative authority.  The potential contingency of hermeneutical experience is 
overcome by two conditions: one, by its foundation in an interpretative tradition; and two, by the 
necessity to provisionally accept the normative authority of that which is being interpreted. 
Such an ethics of continuity, then, holds that an individual lives within an ethical 
substance which opens the possibility of a dialogue between the subject and his inherited 
identity, the community and those values which offer themselves as motives.  The tradition also 
supplies the rational model on which one can argue with other traditions, it confers on us reason 
but does not determine us by reason. 
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Vattimo admits that Gadamer is developing Heidegger’s thought: the truth of 
hermeneutics is related to that which Heidegger constantly refers to as the destiny of Being and 
Gadamer understands this to mean that the commitment to the most reasonable interpretation of 
a tradition overcomes the arbitrariness of a specific subject’s or society’s prejudices.  The 
process of interpretation negates arbitrariness in that the action of interpreting is determined by 
the subject becoming that which the tradition demands.  Gadamer grants authority to the 
historical process rather than the subject’s appropriation of it, thus tending to conservatism. 
It is this conservatism which Vattimo sees as going too far.  Truth, for him, is found in 
the tradition, but the subject has to be aware of the possibility of ideological corruption.29  If the 
agent interprets his own perspective, then he does so from within that perspective to which he 
has granted normative authority.  Conservatism of this sort does not enable dialogue between 
traditions, but obstructs it.  Vattimo, therefore, holds that the weak nihilism of Nietzsche which 
grants respect to other traditions, saves his own ethics from conservatism.  Conservatism is a 
refusal of pluralism and hides a latent historical metaphysics which silences dialogue. 
Habermas begins his response to Gadamer from the idea that one’s prejudice could be an 
ideology and that hermeneutics alone is unable to overcome ideology.  For him, the experience 
of truth has to be accessed through public language.  Thus, the speaker has the right of 
"unlimited communication" which entails (universally) that I cannot silence the other, since only 
through open and continuous debate can public language be purified of ideologies and 
distortions of truth.  Universally agreed norms govern dialogue and ensure that the corrupting 
nature of a perspective is constrained. 
The main problem with an ethics of communication is that it entails the claim to 
universality implicit in Kantian morality.  Hegel was quick to criticise Kant for that which he 
termed "empty formalism."30  He held that the universal rules of reason could not generate 
imperatives on which a subject can act.  Reason can only test and not generate laws.  Habermas 
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recasts reason as procedural: formal rules which constrain the content of discourse and, in this 
way, he believes hermeneutics can avoid ideological bias. 
Vattimo agrees to this, but notes a significant feature: if the procedures regulate the 
content of the will, but do not determine it, why should we accept them?  Reason permits and 
rejects certain content, but it cannot make us accept its own rules (content is, after all, given 
historically), thus why should we prefer dialogue to violence? 
[The ethics of communication] can in fact try to avoid the accusation of still being a 
transcendental metaphysics (which posits as a normative foundation of morality the 
fact that experience is made possible by the a priori of unlimited communication) by 
stressing the pure formality of its conception; it excludes all metaphysical rigidity to 
the extent that it conceives morality to be negotiation, persuasion by way of rational 
argumentation, not limited by any necessary metaphysical structure.  In this respect, 
the ethics of communication presents itself as a rigorously egalitarian ethics.  But at 
the same time, it shows itself unable to exclude the possibility that the egalitarianism 
and the negotiation come to be understood in the sense of pure escalation of social 
conflict.  Why, in the end, if there are no metaphysical principles, should we prefer 
rational argumentation to physical confrontation? [EI; p. 146/119]31 
If the procedures of reason are formal, then they cannot exclude violence as argument: the norms 
have to exist substantially within a tradition to motivate the agent.  Vattimo recognises that 
unlimited communication is necessary for pluralism and dialogue, but if it is an a priori 
procedure it does not rule out violence.  What is required is a tradition which substantiates the 
values of an ethics of communication and, it is for this reason, Vattimo goes beyond the 
subjectivism of Rorty, the conservatism of Gadamer and the formalism of Habermas.  
Hermeneutics is, for him, inclined towards ethics and this ethics has to be understood in terms of 
a tradition – that is, the shared customs, culture and mores of a specific community – which 
underlie and make possible the various discourses of knowledge.  As such, he seeks a 
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postmodern ethics which makes possible his weakly nihilistic position and the enfeeblement of 
truth: 
The ethics that hermeneutics makes possible seems to be primarily an ethics of 
goods… more than an ethics of imperatives.  Or better still, if there is an ethics 
delineated in hermeneutics, it is one in which, taking interpretation as an act of 
translation… the various logoi – discourses of specialized languages, but also 
spheres of interests, regions of "autonomous" rationality – are to be referred back to 
the logos-common consciousness, to the cradling substratum of values shared by a 
living hisotircal community and expressed in its language. [EI; p. 136/106-7] 
Habermas invokes an ethics of imperatives and, like Kant, relies on theoretical wisdom, that is a 
knowledge of the rules which determine which objects are good.  However, Vattimo realises that 
such a position will not generate good because one requires practical wisdom, or an ethics of 
goods.  Being brought up in a certain tradition gives us experience of acting according to 
characteristics.  If we have experience of the best goods, we will interpret more reasonably.  
Interpretation does not depend on knowledge of imperatives (as Habermas supposes), it depends 
on being informed by those goods which enable the best interpretation; goods found in one’s 
moral fabric.  Vattimo holds that "the cradling substratum of values" in postmodern society is 
not just any tradition (relativism), nor the true tradition (conservatism), but the historically 
existing substantial equivalent of Habermas’s formalism.  In other words, the goods which 
underlie postmodern society make possible an ethics of communication and these values can 
originally be found in the philosophies of Nietzsche and Heidegger.32  It therefore remains to 
offer an initial sketch of the values underlying postmodernity.  However, first, there is one small 
– yet significant – point to be made. 
 It may have been noticed that Vattimo criticised Rorty on the basis of need for a tradition 
and Gadamer on the basis of a critical subject.  Is this not a case of having it both ways?  
Paradoxically, it is this “having it both ways” – the oscillation between these two poles – which 
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is characteristic of Vattimo’s solution.  The opposites of Gadamer and Rorty reflect the deeper 
antagonism between Heidegger and Nietzsche, and it is these opposites which temper one 
another’s excesses.  The idea of the destiny of Being which originates in Heidegger leads to 
Gadamer’s conservatism and the disappearance of critique, yet Vattimo inserts a nihilist subject 
which does not accept that history is truth, but that history is the happening of truth and therefore 
the best access the subject has to it.  Yet, the subject cannot be swallowed in the act of 
interpretation, the nihilism of Nietzsche holds that any articulation of the event of truth can only 
be an interpretation.  Conversely, the nihilism of Nietzsche becomes, in excess, the subjectivism 
of Rorty or Deleuze, yet this is tempered by a commitment to truth which is to be found in the 
historical event of Being. 
However, even if these two positions temper one another, they are not brought together in 
a Hegelian Aufgehoben, for this would be to overcome modernity and “overcoming” is the very 
essence of modernity.33  Hegel would suppose that the truth of the two positions can be brought 
together revealing a new, truer structure, yet Vattimo refuses this modern form of progress.  
Rather it is Heidegger’s Verwindung, the recollection, distortion and rehabilitation of the 
presence of both nihilism and hermeneutics as the thought of the end of history which makes 
possible the best interpretation.34  He concludes his critique of late modernity from the nihilist 
perspective with these words: 
In this situation, one must speak according to me of a “weak ontology” as the only 
possibility of leaving metaphysics – through an acceptance-convalescence-distortion 
[viz. Verwindung] that has nothing left of the critical overcoming characteristic of 
modernity.  It might be that in this resides, for postmodern thought, the chance of a 
new, weakly new, beginning. [my trans.] [FM; p. 189]35 
Instead of negating and synthesising the positions of Heidegger and Nietzsche, Vattimo wishes 
to keep the tension, to stress there is no going beyond and it is the oscillation from one to the 
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other that makes interpretation possible.  The common logos is, for us, cradled by nihilism and 
hermeneutics, and it is in these that an ethics originates: 
… it is the ethics of interpretation that furnishes morality with the more substantial 
rationale – though not, to be sure, with a foundation.  To the extent that hermeneutics 
recognizes itself as provenance and destiny, as the thought of the final epoch of 
metaphysics and thus of nihilism, it can find in "negativity", in dissolution as the 
"destiny of Being", given not as presence of the arche but only as provenance, the 
orienting principle that enables it to realize its own original inclination for ethics 
whilst neither restoring metaphysics nor surrendering to the futility of a relativistic 
philosophy of culture. [EI; p. 147/119] 
The ethics Vattimo searches for is the common conception of the good that makes possible the 
weakly nihilist subject of Nietzsche and the commitment to truth as historical as found in 
Heidegger.  The Verwindung of these two positions, the reciprocal tempering they operate on 
one another advocates certain values from which any process of interpretation must draw its 
provenance. 
It is in the article, "Etica della Provenienza", Vattimo is most explicit of the form such an 
ethics of interpretation would take and describes those goods which derive from the common 
logos of nihilism and hermeneutics.  Ethics is based upon the normative question and it is the 
possibility to interrogate a situation in terms of this question which opens the debate.  First, it 
must be possible to transcend one’s immediate position: 
The first characteristic of such an ethics can be recognised in a "step back", in taking 
distance from the concrete choices and options which are immediately imposed by 
the situation. [my trans.] [EP; p.75] 
This is the transcendence of freedom: I am not this situation, I am not this person.  Moreover, it 
is the recognition of the "step back" as a refusal of the absolute nature of truth: the most obvious 
response to a situation is not always the right one, one must question everything.  A tradition and 
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its epistemological commitments must be observed externally.  It is here that one feels the 
influence of Nietzsche and the refusal of an interpretation as truth.  Yet, as we have seen, such a 
refusal must be tempered by continuity.  The subject outside all traditions is hollow and cannot 
communicate, one must comprehend with respect to a form of life, to value, to norms.  The 
shadow of subjectivity demanded by weak thought must remain.  Secondly, therefore, an ethics 
of interpretation has the characteristic of finitude: 
An ethics of finitude is that which seeks to stay faithful to the discovery of the 
always unsurpassably finite setting of its own origin without forgetting the pluralistic 
implications of this discovery.  I am with the saints in church and with the boozers 
down the pub, and I cannot fool myself into placing myself in a higher condition; 
even when I utter this phrase in a philosophical discourse I am only in another 
condition, that imposes certain obligations on me, as all the others: the particular 
condition of the philosopher, of the essayist, of the critic, never of universal Man. 
[my trans.] [EP; pp. 77-8] 
Any obligations, any maxims for action or tables of values come from the situation and its truth, 
not from any ground of absolute truth.  One must be aware of the situation or history which one 
occupies and the claims they make on one’s identity.  More than this, one must be aware of both 
one’s tradition and the tradition of the other if truth is to be disclosed.  The recognition of plural 
truth must be tempered, as Gadamer would propose, by a sense of continuity of who I am, where 
I come from, and the same for the other.  Ethics has to be constructed within the finitude of one’s 
position and it involves recognising the values at play and evaluating what relation they bear 
equally to oneself and the situation.  Which is the better perspective from which to articulate the 
sanctity of marriage, the pub or the church?  Which the fitness of a football player?  And which 
the moral problem of abortion?  It is an awareness of the perspective from which one speaks and 
an accountability to one’s tradition and identity, for only if one assumes continuity can values 
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develop their truth.  Only through interpretation of the situation in historical terms will its partial 
truth be revealed with relation to oneself. 
Finally, Vattimo adds: "Respect of the other is above all recognition of the finitude that 
characterises us both, and that excludes every definitive overcoming of the opacity that everyone 
brings with himself." [my trans.] [EP; p. 80] With the recognition of the "weakness" of one’s 
own truth, comes the claim to validity of other truths.  One cannot silence other voices because 
they, too, reveal a perspective on the truth and one cannot assume to know the truth of others 
without first hearing their words since the subjective will remains always opaque and inviolable.  
Thus, the openness of communication pleaded for by Habermas and the consequential 
procedural model of reason which rules communication has to originate from a substantial, 
postmodern way of life.  One must interpret other values and their relation to their tradition and 
one’s own; to do this one must respect the voice of difference or others.  The reason for which is 
obvious: 
If [the rational norms] must or must not be applicable, it is decided in the name 
of the guiding thread which, with a responsible interpretation, we assume as 
characteristic of that which is "truly" part of the heritage towards which we 
feel obliged.  If we identify this guiding thread with nihilism, with the 
dissolution of absolute foundations and of their imposition – that is each and 
every time violent interruption of the questioning – then the choice between 
that which is applicable and that which is not of the cultural heritage from 
which we originate will be made by the criterion of the reduction of violence 
and in the name of rationality intended as a discourse-dialogue between finite 
positions that recognise one another as such, and that for this reason do not 
have the bent of legitimately imposing themselves (since they are confirmed by 
a first principle) on those of others. [my trans.] [EP; p. 79] 
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Respect stems directly from the resistance to unitary truth.  If one recognises the weakness of 
truth, if one is committed to pluralism, it becomes impossible to value one truth above all other 
perspectives.  Pluralism holds that there exist different, equally valid interpretations of the same 
reality and it is this which distinguishes Vattimo from his contemporaries: it permits him to hold 
on to his commitment to truth.36  
It is in the above quotation that the full extent of an ethics of interpretation is revealed 
and it also discloses the ethical claims of weak thought.  Vattimo talks explicitly of a responsible 
interpretation.  The guiding thread is reason, it is that which preconditions one’s appropriation of 
a perspective.  For Vattimo, this must be a weak nihilism so that one must be open to the 
postulation of other, alternative truths which may either exist alongside one’s own or, in 
exceptional circumstances, conflict with it.37  Furthermore, weak thought entails the rejection of 
violent interruption, or the "no" without response.  "Why is abortion wrong?"  "Because god says 
so and that is the end of it."   Vattimo seeks to reduce the violence of metaphysics in the name of 
reason and to simultaneously recognise the validity of pluralism through the ongoing resistance 
to "evangelical" foundations, those which demand unequivocal obedience.  Pluralism holds that 
even if values are incommensurable in the case of conflict, debate must hold sway, not silence.  
Truth is enfeebled to refuse the violence of absolutism, the crime of silencing difference and the 
other.  Reason is no longer adherence to the principles which originate from a worldview, but the 
rationality of an open dialogue between versions or aspects of the truth.  Accountability arises 
from one’s tradition and identity to the extent that they do not commit violence against the other.  
Such a subject must be able to transcend and interrogate both his identity and his situation.  
Furthermore, such a subject must inhabit a pluralist world, which must imply the values of 
openness, communication and tolerance; yet, such pluralism must be, in turn, interpretation in 
terms of a heritage or tradition which imposes on one’s account the continuity with which to 
communicate the "truth" of a perspective.   
§4| Conclusion: the Moral Fabric of Postmodern Subjectivity 
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The essay opened with the premise that Vattimo’s postulation of weak thought is original and 
significant for two reasons: one, that he retains a commitment to truth even if he accepts 
nihilism; and two, he does not fully endorse the death of the subject.  Regarding the first point, it 
appears patent in Vattimo’s simultaneous recognition of the connection between power and 
knowledge and his refusal to reject knowledge on this basis, that he is committed to truth.  Not 
full, absolute truth, but partial, plural truth.  He is a weak nihilist: the categories which determine 
knowledge are not grounded in truth but originate due to some interest or contingent structure, 
yet they still allow one to experience truth.  Categories corrupt, but they are necessary, for 
without them the subject is – one may remember – blind. 
 However, it is this weak nihilism and its pluralistic consequences which support 
Vattimo’s rejection of the death of the subject.  The death of the subject is to be understood as 
the deconstruction of the illusion that it is the subject who experiences the world, rather – it is 
held – the experience is merely that of the determining structure, be it the unconscious, the deep 
economic structure or the contingency of language itself.  For hermeneutic interrogation to be 
possible, there must be a subject – a shadow of subjectivity – which can interrogate the claims of 
weak truth which makes experience possible by adopting a moderately external point of view on 
perspectives.  It is a subject which is first announced in Nietzsche’s texts and, according to 
Vattimo, fulfilled in Heidegger and the idea of Being as event giving itself historically.  This 
subjectivity is the dreamer aware of his dreaming, the nihilist, of Nietzsche tempered with the 
projection of the question attempting to comprehend Being found in Heidegger.  Such a subject 
is ethical and necessary to begin the philosophical quest for the best interpretation, but it is not a 
knowing subject which would test strong truth; that is, the correspondence of an object to its 
conditions of being experienced.  The hermeneutic subject is ethical because the norms which 
oblige the knowing subject should conform to an evaluative description which guarantees the 
absence of violence: transcendence (freedom), reasonableness in terms of one’s tradition, 
openness, limited tolerance (limited by the refusal of violence), recognition of the individual’s 
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right to propose his worldview and respect for others.  This is not an exhaustive list, nor even a 
certain one, but simply the first attempt at naming those values which are shared in postmodern 
culture and which determine one’s comportment to others.  The point is that these values require 
a subject to apply them – thus, the shadow of subjectivity thus far termed the hermeneutic 
subject – and they arise from the common, shared logos of the postmodern epoch; viz. the 
cradling nihilistic and hermeneutic substratum. 
 It seems that in the final instance weak thought reveals certain normative claims which 
apply to the conditions of experience.  For me to propose my worldview as true, I must be aware 
of the other’s right to dispute it and I must encourage this right through explicating said truth in a 
manner in which the other can understand and, therefore, dispute.  These values are universal, in 
that one must adhere to them to resist both metaphysical violence and irrational, strong nihilism; 
and normative in that they prescribe the conditions for one’s truth to meet so that it does not fall 
into one of these two positions.  They are the substantial account of the good which constitutes 
postmodern society. 
 The relevance of weak thought and its consequent ethics of interpretation is to supply an 
ethical basis for truth claims.  The true cannot, in its totality and transparency, be grasped in a 
single act of possession.  Truth is not easy.  Rather, what these values propose is a "reductive 
ethics" not dissimilar to Kant’s reductive metaphysics.  How can one best approximate the truth 
given its opacity and historical taints?  Of course, implicit in Kant is the idea that one cannot but 
see in terms of space, time, causality, et al.  The "reductive ethics" here proposed is not universal 
in this sense nor a new substantial, metaphysical picture of man because it does not hold the 
belief that these values are the absolute foundation of our ethical perception.  They are, however, 
universal and normative in another sense: they are universal to the extent that they supply the 
foundations for the possibility of agreement on the best approximation of the true.  They 
constrain illegitimate perspectives and set the limits of claims to truth.  Thus, we have an ethical 
(normative) basis for truth claims.  
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 Protestantism, as exemplified in its secular twin, the Enlightenment, was the rejection of 
authority in favour of reason.  Vattimo proposes the same move, but does not wish to fully reject 
authority since it is necessary for experience and constitutes reason.  Instead he chooses to 
constrain it by hermeneutic interrogation.  His weak nihilism rejects the possibility of ever 
answering once and for all the metaphysical question.  For Kant, one could not transcend one’s 
categories of understanding and so the metaphysical question was unanswerable.  Yet, all 
theories of knowledge, all sciences, depend upon a metaphysical worldview (often nowadays 
termed rather humbly a method).  For Kant, the ultimate method was reason itself, but such a 
response is not open to Vattimo.  Alternatively, he must admit the possibility of plural 
metaphysics or methods with incommensurable entities or suppositions, whilst simultaneously 
allowing for such metaphysics to prove their worth.  It is for this reason he is still committed to 
truth and a shadow of subjectivity.  If this is the case, then postmodernity cannot be the 
overcoming of modernity, but rather its fulfilment or – as Vattimo would say – its necessary 
enfeebling. 
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names so that when the reader refers to Vattimo’s own writings, he or she will be aware of what is at stake.  For the 
authors’ own views, refer to most notably Deleuze, G (1968) Difference and Repetition trans. Patton, P (London: 
Athlone Press; 1994); Rorty, R (1979) Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Oxford: Blackwell; 1980); Gadamer, 
H-G (1960) Truth and Method trans. Weinsheimer, J & Marshall, D (London: Sheed & Ward; 1989); Habermas, J 
(1981) The Theory of Communicative Action 2 vols. trans. McCarthy, T (Cambridge: Polity Press; 1997). 
9 One recalls the hero of Camus’s L’Etranger whose only response to the world is to try and destroy those orders of 
meaning which confront him, simultaneously destroying himself. 
10 On this point, see Heidegger, M (1935) “The Origin of the Work of Art” trans. Hofstadter, A in Basic Writings 
ed. Krell, D F (London: Routledge; 1993). 
11 I think here of the impossibility to reconcile the ideas of responsibility and hard genetics.  Why should we punish 
someone who was materially determined to steal?  The question itself crosses an illegitimate boundary between 
morality and science.  It implicitly assumes that the genetic-scientific perspective is both relevant and absolutely 
true.  As such, it confuses the whole issue simply through asking the wrong question.  Perhaps this small point is all 
that Hume was after, see (1739) A Treatise on Human Understanding (Oxford: Clarendon Press; 1978); III, I, ch. 1.  
The relation of Hume’s naturalistic fallacy to weak thought is further elaborated in Antiseri op-cit. 
12 This is slightly modified, in Snyder's translation "compiuto" is rendered as "accomplished." 
13 For a good discussion of differing appropriations of Nietzsche and weak (Italian) nihilism as opposed to the 
strong (French) nihilism, see D’Agostini in VRF, pp. 13-20. 
14 For these criteria, see the preface (or "premise" as it is called), written jointly by Vattimo and Pier Aldo Rovatti, 
to PD; p. 9. 
15 Vattimo discusses Nietzsche’s Übermensch in ch. 6 of EI and in his works explicitly dedicated to Nietzsche, 
namely Al di là del soggetto (Milano: Feltrinelli; 1981); and Introduzione a Nietzsche (Bari: Laterza; 1985).  
Nietzsche’s own exposition, as one well knows, is sprinkled around his many texts. 
16 There exists one more criterion here, whereby Vattimo and Rovatti distance themselves from a Deleuzian 
approach following this discovery.  Whereas Deleuze revels in the symbolic forms and gives them equal weight to 
things-in-themselves, thereby deconstructing the distinction and making the world a chaotic, Dionysian game of 
rhetoric; they, instead, still hold on to a version of truth – no matter how weak – and the possibility to articulate 
rationally in contrast to irrationally.  Deleuze is the strong nihilist, who I referred to earlier, with the addition that he 
just doesn't give a damn.  Cf. Difference and Repetition (1968) and Deleuze, G & Guattari, F (1968) Anti-Oedipus 
trans. Hurley, et al (London: Athlone Press; 1984). 
17 I should say, a certain interpretation of Nietzsche and Heidegger; this is Vattimo’s ploy.  The conservatism 
inherent in Heidegger is developed in Gadamer’s elaboration, and the subjectivism of Nietzsche is developed in 
both Rorty’s relativism and Deleuze’s nihilism.  Through interrogating these interpretations, Vattimo re-interprets 
the two original thinkers and draws out their common weak nihilism; an interpretation which again differs.  Again, 
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this article does not dwell on the cogency of the respective interpretations, the interest – as before – remains 
Vattimo’s ethics.  However, I do stress the tension and I think rightly so, for example Heidegger at one point says 
echoing Vattimo's criticisms of Deleuze/Rorty: "Nietzsche's passion for creators betrays the fact that he thinks of the 
genius and the geniuslike only in a modern way, and at the same time technologically from the view-point of 
accomplishment."; in "Overcoming Metaphysics" (1954) in The End of Philosophy trans. Stambaugh, J (London: 
Souvenir Press; 1973); p. 94. 
18 It is the normative form of the concepts and categories of being which best exemplifies the move from Kantian 
reason to hermeneutic reason.  For Kant, one could not but see in terms of universal categories, for a hermeneutic 
view the norm is no longer “must” but “should” given that there are other possible traditions.  This difference 
between must and should opens up the Heideggerean (and deconstructionist) question: why should I?  Is it because 
Being dictates it thus, or because hidden (perhaps, unconscious) interests hope to corrupt my perception of Being 
for some other motive.  It is for this reason that Vattimo resists the interpretation of Heidegger as a conservative, 
and he himself will not accept conservatism as a possible hermeneutic ethics. 
19 On this, see Snyder in the English version of FM, pp. xxii-xxi. 
20 Refer especially to aphorism number 54 in Nietzsche, F (1882) The Gay Science trans. Kaufmann, W (New York: 
Vintage; 1974). 
21 The translation has been slightly amended by the inclusion of the adjective "certain" or "certo." 
22 His latest book – VRF – is, after all, entitled The Philosopher's Vocation and Responsibility. 
23 It may be obvious that I am ignoring one other response to the problem of relativism, one which is strongly 
connected to conservatism and, in many respects, Heidegger: the theological or religious response.  In Part Two of 
his book, Antiseri op-cit. believes Vattimo should embrace theological agnosticism.  Vattimo himself explores this 
avenue in Credere di credere (Milano: Garzanti; 1996), (and elsewhere) yet remains too Nietzschean to accept it.  
His religion can only be a "weak" religion and thus appropriated by the fulfilled nihilist via his own ethically 
permissible re-interpretation.  Religion as a response to relativism is, at best, merely a step towards an ethics of 
interpretation (hence the centrality of pietas in Vattimo’s early works) as Vattimo himself seems to advocate: “… I 
am no longer able to conceive of the notion of truth as distinct from evangelical charity.  The only emancipation of 
which I can think is an eternal life of charity, that is in listening to others and participating in dialogue with others." 
[my trans.]; VRF, p. 103.   
24 In ST, Vattimo believes this to be the central feature of the modern attitude: one chooses the new because the new 
itself is good. 
25 Contemporary liberalism obscures the issue by picking easy targets: I can agree that whether one eats beef or one 
eats dog can never rise above a tradition and is not, therefore, a case of objective morality, but I am not so willing to 
concede this as concerns female circumcision.  And, if that is the case, what about male circumcision?  Vattimo’s 
ethics may allow us to interrogate such traditions and work them over, so that their hidden grounds are revealed. 
26 For Vattimo’s discussions, refer to EI and the final chapter of the English translation of ST; OI, ch. 3; and EP. 
27 Rorty, then, is not surprisingly similar to Deleuze since relativism and subjectivism differ only in degree and not 
in form.  Vattimo ruled out an appeal to pure subjectivism in his three defining criteria of weak thought, see pp. 7-8 
above and note 14 and here re-iterates his reasons why.  For this reason, the grounds on which Vattimo rejects 
Rorty are the same grounds on which he rejected Deleuze's position. 
28 Cf.  VRF, pp. 71-73 & 105-106. 
29 For a good discussion of Gadamer’s conservatism, refer to chs. 3 and 4 of Warnke, G Gadamer: Hermeneutics, 
Tradition and Reason (Cambridge: Blackwell; 1987). 
30 The clearest exposition of this is to be found in “On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Law…” (1802) in 
Political Writings trans. Nisbet, H (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1999), although it recurs throughout 
his work. 
31 The English page number refers to the translation of ST. 
32 Habermas is the formal aspect of postmodernity as Kant’s morality was the formal aspect of the Enlightenment.  
For Hegel, Kant’s morality could only work if one understood its history and its place in ethical life as a whole (the 
necessary moment of subjectivity), that is the objective structure which makes it possible.  One feels Vattimo’s 
point is very similar: yes, Habermas, that is the formal aspect, but why is it thus? 
33 Refer to the introduction to FM. 
34 For Vattimo’s own presentation of this, refer to his article in PD and ch. 10 of FM.  D’Agostini’s discussion is 
good in VRF, pp. 35-37 and she hints that Vattimo may be more indebted to Hegel than he acknowledges.  For  a 
concise example of Heidegger's own presentation of Verwindung, refer to chs. 3 and 4 of The End of Philosophy 
(1973). 
35 This passage does not appear in the English translation. 
36 For more on pluralism opposed to relativism, cf. Vattimo, G (1987) “Il pensiero secolarizzato” in Il Poliedro, IV; 
9-10.  
37 If weak thought is to be thought of as relativistic, in any sense whatsoever, this comment reveals that it is that 
which Bernard Williams terms "interesting relativism": "… a province of informative social science, where there is 
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room for such claims as that a given practice or belief is integrally connected with much more of a society's fabric 
than may appear on the surface, that it is not an excrescence, so that discouragement or modification of this may 
lead to much larger social change than might have been expected"; in Williams, B An Introduction to Ethics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); p. 36.  Antiseri, op-cit. ch. 16, does not believe Vattimo 
overcomes relativism, believing a thorough elaboration of Pietas is required.  However, form the late eighties 
through the nineties, Vattimo moved away from Pietas to ethics. 
